Address to Joint Meeting of Houston Chapter, Texas Society of Certified Public Accounants and Houston Chapter, Fianncial Executives Institute, Houston, Texas, November 18, 1986:  a pre-exposure of the Commission\u27s exposure draft by Treadway, James C.
University of Mississippi 
eGrove 
Association Sections, Divisions, Boards, Teams American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection 
1986 
Address to Joint Meeting of Houston Chapter, Texas Society of 
Certified Public Accounants and Houston Chapter, Fianncial 
Executives Institute, Houston, Texas, Noveber 18, 1986: a pre-
exposure of the Commission's exposure draft 
James C. Treadway 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_assoc 
 Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Chairman




1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 




New York Stock Exchange
William S. Kanaga
Chairman (Retired)
Arthur Young & Company
Address
to





Thomas I. Storrs 
Chairman o f the Board (Retired) 
NCNB Corporation
Joint Meeting of 
Houston Chapter
Texas Society of Certified Public Accountants
and
Donald H. Trautlein 












Jack L. Krogstad 




A  P R E - E X P O S U R E  O F  T H E  C O M M I S S I O N 'S  E X P O S U R E  D R A F T
James C. Treadway, Jr.
A PRE-EXPOSURE OF THE COMMISSION’S EXPOSURE DRAFT
The Research Findings
Here are a few things our Commission's research efforts 
of the last year have revealed:
1. In an analysis of 456 lawsuits against auditors; 
spanning the period from 1960 through 1985, a study prepared
for the Commission revealed that:
Management fraud was present in about one-half of 
those cases. Most frequently the auditors paid 
large amounts to settle those cases.
The widespread notion that a business failure 
automatically leads to allegations of audit 
failure is not correct. Of the bankruptcies 
studied, the auditor was sued in only about 20 
percent of the cases. Furthermore, of this 20 
percent, over one-half also involved management
fraud.
2. Our staff's study of 119 actions brought by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission against public companies
and 42 actions brought by the SEC against public auditors
since 1980 found that:
-- Most alleged frauds were perpetrated by upper-
level management (CEO, President, CFO) by improper 
revenue recognition or overstatement of assets. 
Very few alleged frauds involved the actual 
diversion of corporate assets.
The majority of the alleged frauds occurred
because of a breakdown in internal controls.
-- A substantial number -- 31 percent -- of the
public companies involved in the actions did not
have an audit committee.
Most alleged audit failures involved a failure to 
obtain sufficient competent evidential matter and 
to exercise appropriate professional skepticism.
-- Of the auditing firms involved, 74 percent were
non-national firms. Of the 31 non-national firms, 
87 percent were not members of the AICPA’s SEC 
Practice Section.
3. A study conducted by the School of Accounting at 
the University of Southern California on the role of the SEC
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in financial reporting found overwhelming support for 
tougher sanctions against the perpetrators of fraudulent 
financial reporting. USC conducted both in-depth interviews 
and surveyed a broad group of financial executives, cor­
porate secretaries, internal auditors, lawyers, and public 
accountants. 83% of all questioned favored tougher sanc­
tions.
4. Another study conducted by the NAA confirmed the 
crucial role a high level of corporate ethics can play in 
reducing the risk of fraud. Foremost in establishing such 
an ethical awareness are the attitudes and actions of top
management.
5. Two studies sponsored by the Institute of Internal 
Auditors indicate a trend toward increased reliance by 
public auditors on the work of internal auditors, parti­
cularly in audit areas involving computer systems. These 
studies also indicate that internal auditors -- already an 
effective defense against fraud -- can become even more 
effective through enhanced organizational status and profes­
sionalism.
6. A study sponsored by the Financial Executives 
Institute analyzed corporate situational forces and pres­
sures. The findings suggest that many instances of fraudu­
lent financial reporting do not begin with an overt act
3
intentionally designed to deceive. Rather, they frequently 
result from a mixture of Board apathy, unrealistic profit 
pressures, weak controls, and bonus heavy compensation 
plans.
In all, over 20 major studies have been conducted and 
digested by the Commission. Other areas not mentioned 









A Quick Look Back and Forward
Following votes on numerous issues at our last two 
meetings, our staff has begun to prepare an Exposure Draft 
of our Commission’s Report. The draft is scheduled for 
delivery to the Commissioners and our Advisory Board in 
early December. Assuming the Commission gives final 
approval around the first of the year, the Exposure Draft
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will be publicly distributed on approximately March 1. We 
plan a 90 day comment period and plan to publish our Report 
in final form on approximately August 1, 1987.
March 1 is almost four months away, so occasions such 
as this allow us to "pre-expose" the Exposure Draft and 
hopefully start the comment process in advance of the formal 
Exposure Draft. We invite all of you to submit comments, be 
they positive, neutral, or negative.
Those who have followed our Commission’s work will 
recall that our long-standing charge has been to analyze all 
the whys and wherefores of fraudulent financial reporting 
and propose the ultimate solutions to eradicate forever this 
pernicious activity. While we have reached many specific 
conclusions —  and I will come to those momentarily -- one 
overall, dominant conclusion has emerged. Fraudulent 
financial reporting is -- probably always has been and will 
be -- a multi-dimensional problem -- that many factors 
contribute -- and that multiple causal influences are at 
work. Many of you may have heard me say that before. But I 
say it again to underscore that no single conclusion,
observation or recommendation of our Commission can be
separated from the totality of all of our decisions. The 
entirety of the mosaic must be taken into account.
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As you will see momentarily, our initial conclusions 
potentially impact all -- issuer, regulator, auditor, 
educator, director, law enforcer, and professional organiza­
tion. And some of our conclusions will be controversial and
will generate considerable input and comment. You also 
should note that I have used the phrase "initial conclu­
sions." That is what they are. Our Commissioners reserve 
the right to continue to think about any and all issues and 
initial conclusions and to change their minds. That process 
will continue until the Exposure Draft is sent to the 
printer and throughout the comment process.
The Reporting Entity
Let’s now explore some of those initial conclusions.
As you know, our Commission has focused extensively on the 
reporting entity and its management, recognizing that 
management has both the initial and final responsibility for
accurate financial statements.
In considering the reporting entity, we have limited
our recommendations to those that would enhance the overall
control environment within the corporation. We have not - 
considered governance issues as such, but have focused on 
those elements of corporate structure that are intrinsically 
part of the overall control environment. We further believe 
that a large number of companies already have in place many
6
of the characteristics —  the elements of a sound control
environment —  we are recommending.
We have initially concluded that:
1. Mandatory Audit Committees. Audit Committees 
should be mandated for all publicly-owned corporations, as 
well as for other entities that draw on public funds for 
capital, such as mutual thrift institutions. The SEC should 
exercise the authority it has said it has to mandate Audit 
Committees as a condition of being a  public company. Audit 
Committees should include at least a majority of independent 
directors. At the same time, we recognize that some 
issuers, for valid reasons, may find it difficult to attract 
the necessary persons to fulfill this role. We therefore 
will recommend that the SEC’s rule requiring Audit Commit­
tees recognize this by providing a mechanism for exemptions 
for those issuers that demonstrate that they have (a) 
diligently attempted to attract the necessary independent 
directors to comprise the Audit Committee and (b) instituted 
various mechanisms and controls that perform the functions 
of an Audit Committee. Such exemptions should be granted 
only in unusual cases. This decision on mandatory Audit 
Committees reflects our Commission’s views that an informed, 
diligent Audit Committee may be the single most effective 
influence for minimizing fraudulent financial reporting and
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that Audit Committees are an integral part of internal
controls.
2. Role of the Audit Committee; Guidelines. Audit 
Committees should be activists and should be deeply involved 
in the financial reporting process. To that end, we intend 
to publish ’’good practice” guidelines for Audit Committees, 
for we have found -- surprisingly perhaps -- great disparity 
among Audit Committees’ functions and effectiveness. It is 
our hope that our guidelines will (a) offer practical 
guidance to those seriously concerned with their role as 
Audit Committee members; (b) enable an Audit Committee that 
essentially follows the guidelines to assert such compliance 
as a defense in litigation, thus addressing existing lia­
bility concerns in a positive fashion; and (c) suggest that 
an Audit Committee that ignores the guidelines without good 
and sound reasons will know that it may be doing so at its 
peril if fraudulent financial reporting occurs.
3. Audit Committee Resources. Audit Committees
should have adequate resources to discharge their role.
They also should have standing authority to initiate inves­
tigations, including the authority to retain counsel or 
experts.
4. Audit Committee Chairman’s Letter to Stockholders.
The role of Audit Committees should be more visible and
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better communicated to the public. The Chairman of the 
Audit Committee should be required to include in the Annual 
Report to Stockholders his own letter describing the activi­
ties of the Audit Committee. This should be mandated by the 
SEC and should include, among other things, a discussion of 
the Committee’s activities for the past year.
5. Management’s Acknowledgement. Corporate manage­
ment should affirmatively acknowledge in the Annual Report 
to Stockholders that they have the foremost and ultimate 
responsibility for accurate financial statements. This
recommendation dovetails with a recommendation I will come 
to shortly about revising the standard auditors’ report.
6. Fraud Risk Assessment Program. All public com­
panies should have a fraud risk assessment and fraud risk 
management program. The risk of fraud should be assessed 
and monitored continuously by management and reviewed 
annually by the Audit Committee.
7. The Control Environment. Internal controls should
not be structured mechanically. The correct emphasis should
be on the overall control environment. This should be
monitored actively by the Audit Committee.
8. Management’s Opinion on Internal Controls. 
Corporate management should be required to express an
9
opinion on the adequacy of internal controls. This conclu­
sion reflects the Commission’s belief that internal controls 
and internal audit represent the first line of defense 
against fraudulent financial reporting.
9. Mandatory Internal Audit Function. All public 
companies should be required to maintain an internal audit 
function. Note that I said function, not internal auditor.
The Commission believes that the function is key. It does 
not have to be a separate department and could even be done 
by the independent auditor. The size of the department and 
each individual’s background and training should be appro­
priate for the size and nature of the company’s business.
We also intend to publish some "good practice” guidelines 
relating to this activity.
10. The Internal Auditor. The Chief Internal Auditor
should administratively report directly to the Chief Execu­
tive Officer or a senior financial officer who does not have 
direct involvement in the preparation of the company’s 
financial statements. Furthermore, the Chief Internal
Auditor should have direct access to the Audit Committee and
should meet privately with the Audit Committee on a regular
basis.
11. Involvement of the Internal Audit. Management and
Audit Committees should insist that their internal auditors
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have greater involvement in the audit of the financial 
reporting process.
12. The Tone at the Top; Corporate Ethics. The tone 
and atmosphere set at the top is a crucial influence for 
deterring and preventing fraudulent financial reporting. To 
influence and reinforce that tone, all companies should 
adopt, publicize and enforce written codes of conduct which, 
among other things, deal with the obligation to account 
accurately to stockholders. This written code of ethics 
must be supported by top management; it should be general 
rather than overly specific; it should be prepared with 
employee participation; it should be appropriate for the 
company’s business; and it should be updated as necessary so 
that it is a "living code.” We will include one or more 
models as exhibits to our Report. The Audit Committee 
should evaluate compliance with the code, on an annual 
basis, including compliance by top management, focusing on 
matters such as perks, use of company assets, and related 
party transactions.
13. Special Needs For Enhanced Internal Controls.
While certain management techniques -- such as management by 
objective and decentralized operations -- are perfectly 
valid management techniques, they inherently involve the 
potential for abuses of the financial reporting process.
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Such techniques thus heighten the already pressing need for 
strong internal controls.
The Public Accountant
Let’s turn from the reporting entity to the public
accountant.
1. Detecting Fraud. On the issue of the auditor's 
responsibility to detect, and perhaps report, suspected 
fraud, our Commission has concluded that auditing standards 
relating to the auditor's responsibility to detect fraud 
need to be clarified. The revised standards should reflect, 
in a balanced fashion, what the courts are saying already, 
including the acknowledgement of some affirmative obligation 
to detect fraud. Those standards should spell out the 
auditor's obligations in clear, positive, non-defensive 
language.
2. Recent Legislation. While our Commission supports 
smoking out material fraud which can undermine the integrity 
of the financial reporting process, we do not agree with the 
approach considered in the last Congress. We believe that 
the approach considered would introduce an unworkable 
adversarial atmosphere into the audit process. In each 
instance when fraud were suspected, each side inevitably 
would scurry to lawyers to ask: "Is it fraud? Is it
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material fraud? How sure are we? Do we have all the facts 
necessary to make a decision? Have we properly considered 
all the affirmative defenses to the 'suspected* fraudulent 
activity?" And we ought not to forget that fraud is not a 
clearly delineated concept -- it is not black and white. If 
you think otherwise, simply sit down and try to write an 
all-encompassing, crystal clear definition of fraud. I defy 
anyone to do so, having personally participated in numerous 
efforts to draft a clear definition of only one type of 
fraud -- insider trading.
3. The ASB and Public Participation. Auditing 
standards relate directly to the prevention, detection and 
elimination of fraudulent financial reporting -- they come 
into play as much, perhaps more, than accounting principles. 
The Commission believes that continued public interest and 
active involvement in all auditing standards is desirable.
We therefore will recommend that the Auditing Standards 
Board be restructured to include knowledgeable public repre­
sentation and participation.
This initial conclusion on the ASB does not mean that
we fail to appreciate the many contributions of the ASB, nor 
does it mean that we are unimpressed with their efforts and 
results. We are most impressed. Our initial conclusion
about the ASB does mean, however, that we believe that the 
participation of the ultimate public has much potential for
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good, particularly more than an occasional Congressional 
look at one or two specific auditing standards. Such public 
participation would ensure auditing standards responsive to 
the public need and could have the incidental effect of 
dealing positively with the problem of public expectations 
about the audit process. Furthermore, the AICPA already has 
the capability of dealing with technical auditing issues 
through various publications such as Industry Accounting and 
Auditing Guides and Auditing Procedures Studies. Implicit 
in our conclusion is a rejection of the notion that auditing 
is too arcane for the non-technician to contribute meaning­
fully.
4. Revising the Standard Auditor's Report. We will 
recommend that the standard auditor's report be revised to 
communicate better the auditor's role and responsibilities 
—  including those related to fraud detection -- and the 
inherent limitations. This dovetails with our recommenda­
tion that the issuer acknowledge fundamental, ultimate 
responsibility for financial statements free of material 
deficiencies. We do not view this as lessening in any way 
the auditor’s responsibilities, but as clarifying the 
relative and complementary responsibilities for financial 
reporting.
5. Mandatory Membership in a Q.A. Program. The SEC 
should mandate membership in a professional quality
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assurance program such as the AICPA SEC Practice Section (or 
its equivalent) for all auditors involved in audits of 
public companies. No exceptions should be permitted -- 
absolutely none. And we believe the SEC has the rule-making 
authority to impose this standard. If the SEC disagrees, it 
should immediately move to obtain this authority.
6. Opinion-Shopping and Second Opinions. The Commis­
sion firmly believes that management should be free to seek 
second accounting opinions, but we also believe that the 
abuses inherent in opinion-shopping must be reduced. If and 
when a change in auditors occurs, companies should be 
required to disclose the nature of any material accounting 
issues they discussed with their old and new auditors during 
the three-year period preceding the change. The Audit 
Committee should be informed when management seeks a second 
opinion on a significant accounting issue. These require­
ments should apply with equal force to first time regis­
trants.
7. Auditor Involvement in 10-Q's. The Commission 
believes that more involvement by the independent auditor in 
interim financial reports is merited. The Commission 
therefore will recommend that the independent accountants be 
required to conduct a timely review of quarterly financial 
reports, and that quarterly financial reports be accompanied
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on the corporate side with increased oversight and partic­
ipation by the Audit Committee.
8. Non-Audit Services. Non-audit services performed 
by the public auditor continue to be a matter of public 
interest. On that issue, the Commission has initially
concluded that ASR 250 should be reinstated.
9. Analytical Review. Analytical review procedures, 
which have proved to be so effective in detecting potential 
fraudulent financial reporting, should be emphasized more. 
The Commission will recommend that greater emphasis be 
placed on analytical review procedures and that they be 
performed by executive level members of the audit team.
10. Auditor’s Opinion on Internal Controls. The 
Commission will recommend that the public auditor publicly 
provide a negative assurance opinion on internal controls.
The SRO Issue
Statutory self-regulatory organization, a Price Water- 
house SRO, a quasi-SRO, or what? This has been a most 
frustrating issue, perhaps the topic of more discussion than 
any single topic. But before the conclusions, let me walk 
you through our thought process.
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What does an SRO do? What are its characteristics?
What are its objectives? Looking at the stock exchanges and 
the National Association of Securities Dealers, the general 
objectives of an SRO that emerge are:
(1) They impose standards of commercial or profes­
sional conduct, which standards have as their 
primary purpose the protection of those served by 
the regulated group -- i.e., the public customers, 
the public interest.
(2) When the conduct of the regulated fails to measure 
up, they impose sanctions that are not just behind 
the scenes paddlings, but public, believable 
sanctions, such as suspension, expulsion, and
fines.
If those two thoughts correctly identify the character­
istics and objectives of an SRO, by comparison, what do we 
have now, in structure and in practice? Various programs 
exist -- quality assurance oriented and remedial in nature 
-- to monitor and upgrade professional conduct. They 
include SECPS membership, the Public Oversight Board, the 
Special Investigations Committee, internal firm penalties 
and discipline, and so on. By and large, this quality 
assurance program works well, in our Commission’s view, as 
far as it goes. But that listing does not include sanctions
17
that are generally accepted by the public as believable, 
real, meaningful sanctions.
So, how can believable sanctions -- some bluntly call 
them "scalps on the belt," -- be meted out. We conclude 
that the mechanism to perform this function already exists 
-- it’s called the SEC. Yet, the existence of a mechanism 
is not, by itself, enough -- the mechanism must also work. 
That means that the SEC must be active, tough-minded, 
resourceful, and sufficiently funded and staffed; and it 
must possess and demonstrate the will and determination to 
play the primary enforcement role -- to prosecute wrongdoers 
-- so as to preclude any possible perception that any reluc­
tance exists when it comes to being the enforcer. If any 
reluctance whatsoever were even perceived to exist, our 
no-SRO position may not be defensible. A void would exist, 
and voids are usually quickly filled. In addition, the 
accounting profession must support the SEC in this tradi­
tional enforcement role.
So what are we saying? That our "functional" analysis 
tells us that all the structural elements of an SRO pre­
sently exist. If those structural elements work, the logic 
and need for a statutory SRO is gone -- such a creature 
would only duplicate existing functions. But absolutely 
critical to our analysis and conclusion are (1) a robust SEC 
enforcement program and (2) a mandatory requirement that
18
auditors involved in audits of public companies be members 
of a professional organization with an adequate quality 
assurance program. And there is a third consideration -- 
there must be constant monitoring to prevent any possible 
slippage in the system. That means monitoring by the SEC of 
the profession’s quality assurance program, with enforcement 
by the SEC directed against those who violate quality 
assurance standards, and monitoring and support by the 
accounting profession of the SEC’s enforcement efforts.
Regulation and Law Enforcement
Many of the comments I have made are linked to law 
enforcement and regulatory agency activities and considera­
tions. For example, our thoughts about an SRO and the 
"enforcement” role of the SEC, about mandatory Audit Commit­
tees, and about mandatory timely auditor involvement in 
quarterly financial reports all involve the regulatory and 
law enforcement process.
But much of the debate about law enforcement and
regulation historically has focused on penalties and sanc­
tions and their effectiveness, or lack thereof -- admittedly 
highly emotional issues. On those specific issues, the 
Commission has initially concluded that:
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1. More Sanctions. As a general proposition, sanc­
tions imposed on those who violate the law by their involve­
ment in fraudulent financial reporting are not adequate.
The University of Southern California study demonstrates, we 
believe, the need for more severe sanctions.
2. Bars. The injunction cannot be blithely dismissed 
as a meaningless wrist slap, as some charge, but more is 
needed. Barring from corporate office those who cause, aid 
and abet, or participate in fraudulent financial reporting 
is an appropriate sanction, and one which ought to be 
regularly considered by the SEC in enforcement proceedings. 
The bar proceeding ought to afford all due process protec­
tions, and we do not offer this conclusion lightly. But, if 
fraudulent financial reporting undermines the integrity and 
reliability of the entire disclosure process —  which we 
believe —  we see no basis for treating corporate offenders 
differently from auditors when it comes to sanctions. Rule 
2(e) allows the SEC to bar or limit the activities of 
individual auditors and firms. The Commission perceives no 
logical reason why those with primary responsibility for 
accurate financial statements should not be subject to 
equivalent sanctions.
3. Criminal Prosecutions. More criminal prosecutions 
and longer sentences for fraudulent financial reporting are 
appropriate. The SEC, while lacking criminal prosecutional
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powers, should undertake an organized, affirmative program 
to educate and to encourage authorities with those powers to 
take a greater interest in criminally prosecuting those 
engaged in fraudulent financial reporting.
4. Fining Authority. The SEC should have fining 
authority to deal with fraudulent financial reporting. Such 
a tool could enable the SEC to fine-tune the sanctioning 
process, to differentiate among degrees of culpability of 
offenders, and to extract any benefit gained by wrong-doing, 
as the SEC does now with insider trading.
5. Cease-and-Desist. The Commission believes the SEC
should have cease and desist authority as a further fine- 
tuning device.
6. Resources. The SEC’s resources should always be 
adequate to enable the SEC to perform, effectively and 
aggressively, the additional functions we are recommending, 
as well as performing the absolutely necessary role of an 
enforcer so as to obviate the need for a separate SRO.
The Liability Issue; Benefits and Burdens
Somewhere in the audience, someone is asking: "But what 
about liability? Auditors’ professional liability insurance
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is disappearing from the scene. D&O coverage is so scarce 
and expensive that outside directors are exiting in droves. 
Yet, your Commission is recommending increased responsibi­
lities and, presumably therefore, increased exposure to 
liability.”
Our answer is: "No, we are not oblivious. And yes, we 
fully understand the connection between responsibility and 
liability."
Our charge was not to solve the "liability crisis,” 
but to deal with fraudulent financial reporting. In the 
process, if we can contribute to a clearer articulation of 
the relative responsibilities of management and the auditor, 
i s  that not desirable compared to the present murkiness? We 
believe our proposals carry that potential. If the ASB is 
reconstituted, does not the resulting "public" participation 
potentially make auditing less subject to attacks on the 
ground that it is too secretive, perhaps too much controlled 
by the "club.” We believe so. Can "good practice guide­
lines" for Audit Committees not only guide those who wish 
guidance about discharging their responsibilities, but also 
provide "safe harbor" standards of conduct which do not 
presently exist? We are operating on that hope, which we 
believe has validity.
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Somewhere in the audience, someone is also asking:
"What about costs and burdens? What about benefits and 
practicality? Were those considered?"
Again, our answer is: ”Yes, of course we considered 
benefits, burdens, costs and practicality. Yes, we under­
stand costs and benefits."
In terms of understanding these issues, I note that 
three of our Commissioners have been CEO’s of major compa­
nies -- the best training in the world about costs and
benefits -- and one of those three holds a Ph. D. in Econom­
ics. A fourth is an internal auditor, who obviously under­
stands costs and benefits. The fifth is a former CEO of a
major international accounting firm and clearly has a keen 
knowledge of costs, burdens and benefits. In addition, four 
of the six Commissioners currently serve as members, if not 
the Chairman, of Audit Committees of public companies and 
regularly deal with financial reporting, costs and benefits, 
and practicality on a regular basis.
Our Commissioners -- who are knowledgeable and familiar 
with the real world -- also believe that the problem of 
fraudulent financial reporting is very real —  notwithstand­
ing the absolute impossibility of quantifying the extent of 
its occurrence -- and that the solutions proposed are, over 
the long run, beneficial and cost effective. Our
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Commissioners also believe that a cost may result from doing 
nothing, a cost which potentially could be great —  the cost 
of the erosion or loss of public confidence, of escalating 
litigation and liability, and possible governmental inter­
vention.
Conclusion
We offer these comments in the hope that the comment 
process will begin now, rather than waiting for our written 
Exposure Draft. All comments -- positive, negative and
neutral —  are welcome.
Thank you for your attention.
* * * * * * *
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